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Foundations of Legal Liabilit. By Thomas Atkins Street. Three
Volumes, pages xxx, 5oo; xviii, 559; xi, 572. Edward
Thompson Co., x9o6.
In these days, out of the great mass of legal publications
comparatively few emerge as real achievements in legal
scholarship. The subject of this review is one of the few. Very
evidently it is by an academic man and it appeals primarily to
academic students of the law; but it appeals equally as much to
the practitioner who desires to understand fundamental princi-
ples and to know other things than the mere tricks of the trade.
The three volumes deal respectively with Torts, Contracts and
Common Law Actions. They purport to contain "a presenta-
tion of the theory and development of the common law."
Throughout the author shows a knowledge of the best previous
thought on the subject, a readiness to adopt and make use of it,
and strength enough to depart from it on occasion and come to a
different conclusion. It is impossible in a brief review to con-
sider the accuracy of many of these conclusions, nor is it possible
to criticise them intelligently without a careful study of the
sources from which they are drawn.
The treatment of the subject of liability for torts in the first
volume is not revolutionary, but is original and highly enlighten-
ing. The classification of torts is in some respects new and is
of assistance in gaining an understanding of the reasons for lia-
bility. For instance, the author puts trespasses committed not
by the defendant directly, but through agents, animate and inan-
imate, into one class, under the title "secondary trespass forma-
tion." This classification, besides grouping several allied sub-jects not heretofore logically classified, assists the author in work-
ing out his treatment of the subject of negligence. The exposi-
tion of the principles underlying liability for torts in the various
subdivisions of the subject is uniformly good, particularly so in
the cases of secondary trespass, defamation, malice and negli-
gence. Perhaps the author is not wholly justified in his criticism
of the doctrine that negligencc consists in a breach of duty to take
care. And perhaps he has not improved upcn it as much as he
thinks. Is it much of an improvement over "negligenceis a
breach of duty" to say "negligence is a sort of legal delin-
quency?" However, he is right in saying that the doctrine that
the law imposes a duty to take care is no real explanation of the
foundation of liability for negligence.
The subject of Contracts in volume two is not given as com-
pl-'te an exposition as is the subject of Torts; but the results
obtained therein by the author are in part more startling and
original. Volume two contains four parts and an appendix.
The author treats first the history and general principles of con-
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tract; second, the history and theory of the law of bailment; third,
the history and principles of the law of bills and notes; and fourth,
the law of representation or agency as affecting the relations of
principal and agent and master and servant. The appendix con-
tains the negotiable instrument's law with annotations. We may
dismiss the second, third and fourth parts with the remark that
they are adequate and accurate, but not new and unusual. The
treatment of agency is much like that of Professor Huffcut. The
historical treatment of bills and notes is deserving of especial
commendation.
The first part alone of the second volume ought to be suffi-
cient to establish the author's reputation as a brilliant thinker in
contracts. After two chapters on the early history of contract,
he plunges into an investigation of the doctrine of consideration,
its foundation and its character, necessarily involving a discussion
of the actions of debt and assumpsit. It is here that he departs
most widely from prior accepted conclusions. Consideration in
the sense of a detriment to the promise is required only in the
case of unilateral contracts. Bilateral contracts acquire their
binding character from consent alone, and not at all from consid-
eration in the sense of detriment. He abandons the vain effort
of determining how it is that a promise is binding because it is a
detriment and is a detriment because it is binding. A third form
in which consideration for a promise may appear is a pre-existing
legal obligation or debt, the doctrine of consideration as a detri-
ment to the promise being here again abandoned. No doubt
these conclusions will find strong opposition on the part- of those
who have been at so much pains to establish the accepted the-
ories of consideration.
The author's mas ery of the distinctions between unilateral
and bilateral contracts is very gratifying to the reader. His
treatment of the foundation of liability on a bilateral contract is
beyond question a brilliant achievement in constructive reason-
ing. He lays down the principle that the obligation of a bilat-
eral contract is based upon consent alone, but he limits the num-
ber of enforceable bilateral contracts to those consisting of
mutual promises to do acts which, considercd wholly apart from
the circumstances of the individual case, would be a detriment to
the actor. This limitation necessarily destroys the simplicity of
the author's construction, but is of course required by the long-
established course of judicial decision. By means of this princi-
ple the author explains the seeming paradox that a promise to
perform an act may be valid consideration for a promise when
the actual performance itself would not be. He asserts that a
unilateral promise is, for historical reasons, not enforceable
unless the act or forbearance given in return amounts to a detri-
ment, but that bilateral promises are binding purely on consen-
sual grounds. However, even though we should agree with him
that the basis of liability on bilateral contracts is consent and not
consideration, still it seems doubtful whether we should not still
further limit the number of enforceable bilateral contracts to those
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consisting of mutual promises to act or to forbear, which act or
forbearance will amount to a detriment in the individual case. This
would bring the rule very close to that constructed by Professor
Williston, though it would avoid the necessity of showing that
the ma)ing of a promise is in itself a detriment. It would fur-
ther be in harmony with those very numerous American decis-
ions to the effect that bilateral promises are invalid where one of
them is to do that which the promisor is already bound by con-
tract to do. The author does not give an adequate review of
these cases. Instead, he places conclusive weight upon such
decisions as Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295, and Abbott v. Doane,
163 Mass. 433.
The author invents (Volume II, page 74) the term "incompe-
tent consideration" for the doing of an act which the actor is
under a legal obligation to do. His treatment of this is not alto-
gether convincing. He adopts Sir F. Pollock's reasoning that
the doing of such an act is no consideration because it is no detri-
ment to the doer. Later, however (Volume II, page 99), in sup-
porting the doctrine that part payment of a debt is not sufficient
consideration for a promise to forego the residue, he cites Pro-
fessor Ames to the effect that the doing of any act is such a detri-
ment to the actor as will support a promise, and adds: "We
admit that payment of part of a debt is an act and that such act
furnishes a consideration for the promise to forego the residue.
The point, however, is that the consideration is incompetent."
This appears to say, part payment is incompetent consideration
because it is no detriment, and it is no detriment because it is
incompetent. The question turns on whether part payment is
actually a detriment, and there is much to be said in favor of the
position of Professor Ames.
The author's conception of legal duty as an adequate substi-
tute for consideration in the sense of detriment causes him to
classify many obligations as truly contractual even though they
are not assumptual. It enables him to throw a clear light upon
the situation existing with reference to promises for the benefit
of a third person, the chapters on that subject being a distinct
addition to its literature. It further requires him to re-classify
the subject of quasi-contracts. Among the quasi-contracts he
places "promises implied as of fact." It appears to the reviewer
that the author's treatment of this term is not altogether clear.
Actual, definite promises may be made by conduct as well as by
words, in which case the obligation assumed is certainly not
quasi-contractual. Yet such promises would seem to be "prom-
ises implied as of fact." Of course, the author is right in classi-
fying as quasi-contractual those obligations created by law
because justice demands it, even though an actual definite prom-
ise cannot be found in the conduct of the parties. But in these
cases there is no "promise implied as of fact." Notwithstanding
this possible obscurity, the author's basic idea is correct, and his
conception of legal duty as contractual is second in importance
only to his theory of bilateral contracts.
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Of his work on the doctrines of accord and satisfaction the
author, in his preface, says: "We have, it is thought, succeeded
in giving a rational and consistent account of this subject from
beginning to end." It is beyond doubt that in the main his work
bears out his statement; but it appears to the reviewer that the
author has failed to give due consideration to the distinction
between an executory accord, looked upon as a contract in itself
and as the basis of an action at law, and an executory accord
looked upon as a satisfaction of the prior obligation and a bar to
an action thereon by the creditor. It may well be that an action
lies for failure to perform an executory accord, even though there
remains a right of action on the original obligation. However,
the author's account of the historical basis for the rule that an
executory accord is no satisfaction is beyond criticism; and his
description of the doctrine as one of " the two greatest mysteries
of the common law," and as "a fossil that has come down to us
from a previous legal formation" is very apt and interesting. In
chapter xiii of volume two, the author sets forth in convincing
fashion the doctrines of novation, establishing that "in its
essence the novation is an executory accord, and the principle
underlying it is at war with the hoary rule that the executory
accord is invalid."
Volume three treats of the forms of action at common law.
It is undoubtedly true that knowledge of these actions and of their
history is necessary to an understanding of the substantive com-
mon law, and that in getting rid of these forms jurisprudence lost
as well as gained. The author's discussion of the origin and
scope of the various remedies at common law is entirely proper
and satisfactory.
The entire work is written in a clear and entertaining style.
The volumes are in dignified form, with good paper, good mar-
gins and legible, errorless type. The substance of each para-
graph is indicated in notes printed on the margin. Volume three
contains a table of some four thousand cited cases and a very full
index. In his preface the author frankly exhibits a calm confi-
dence that his work is original and well done. This confidence
is justified. A.L.C.
Elementos de Derecho Internacional Privado. Third edition. By
Manuel Torres Campos. Madrid, 19o6. Pages 549.
With what was contained in the first edition of this work,
issued in 1893, has been incorporated much of what was in the
subsequent treatise from the same pen, on the Foundations of
Extraterritorial Legislation (Bases de una Legislacion de Eztraterri-
torialidad, Madrid, i896). The present edition omits much of the
bibliography of the earlier ones and adds many references to the
publications of the last ten years, including the doings of the
four Hague Conferences for the Promotion of International Pri-
vate Law, of which the author was a distinguished member.
His discussion of the choice to be made between personal and
territorial law as the criterion of individual rights and duties, is
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